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LEGAL

Will Supreme Court Rule on DOMA?
At justices’ invitation, Harvard Law Professor Vicki Jackson raises strong doubts
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD

W

hen the Supreme
Court accepted the
petition by the US
solicitor general
that it take up Edie
Windsor’s lawsuit against the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), it posed
two questions that could derail any
quick resolution about the 1996 law’s
constitutionality.
First, the solicitor general must
address whether the federal government’s “agreement” with the Second
Circuit ruling that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives the Supreme Court
of “jurisdiction to decide this case.”
The high court also asked whether the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the
US House of Representatives (BLAG) —
which includes the three most senior
Republicans and the top two Democrats,
split along party lines in their view of the
case, and intervened at the trial court to
defend DOMA when the Obama administration declined to do so — has legal
standing to participate in the case.
Since the court assumed neither Windsor, the government, nor BLAG would
argue to the high court that it lacks jurisdiction, the justices appointed Harvard
Law School Professor Vicki Jackson as a
“friend of the Court” to make that argument. Her brief, written with attorneys
from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, was filed on January 24.
Though complex, the jurisdictional
questions raise a serious possibility the
court will not actually decide whether
DOMA is unconstitutional in the Windsor case.
The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Constitution’s provision that “judicial
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ment, citing gay historians to the effect
that most overt discrimination dates
back to the early 20th century, since the
concept of homosexuality itself emerged
only in the mid-19th century. Clement’s assertion conveniently overlooks
the capital punishment that traditional
English law prescribed for “sodomites,”
whether or not they were called homosexuals.
Like Cooper in his Prop 8 brief, Clement adopts the view that the government’s “legitimate” interest in distinguishing between same-sex and different-sex couples is based on the need to
channel heterosexual procreation.
What is striking about both the Prop 8
and DOMA briefs is what is missing. Neither goes in for gay-bashing, asserts that
prohibitions on same-sex marriage can

BLAG argues that since New York
State did not adopt a marriage equality law until 2011, Windsor’s marriage
would not have been recognized by
the state had a case gone to its highest
bench. Without state recognition, BLAG
asserts, Windsor cannot argue the federal government must recognize her marriage. Lower courts, however, concluded otherwise, pointing to intermediate
appellate courts in New York and state

officials who agreed such a marriage
would be recognized even absent a gay
marriage law.
BLAG continues to hold to its argument that Windsor has no valid claim,
though the assertion is made only in
a footnote in its January 22 brief to the
Supreme Court.
The real jurisdictional issue facing the
high court relates to the roles the government and BLAG have played in the case.
Prior to Windsor’s lawsuit going to court,
President Barack Obama and Attorney
General Eric Holder reconsidered their
position on whether the ban on federal recognition of same-sex marriages in DOMA’s
Section 3 was constitutional. When they
concluded it was not, Holder
informed Republican House
Speaker John Boehner the
administration would not
defend DOMA in court, at
which time BLAG intervened,
while the Senate, under Democratic control, expressed no
interest in doing so.
Paul Clement, solicitor general under President George
W. Bush who represents
BLAG as outside counsel,
opposed Windsor’s motion for
summary judgment, the Justice Department argued in favor of it, and
the district court granted it.
Despite the administration’s support
for Windsor’s suit, the Justice Department, having doubts about BLAG’s
standing to appeal, filed an appeal of
its own to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals to ensure the issue would continue making its way through the courts.
Though the Justice Department argued
before the Second Circuit that it should

affirm Windsor’s district court victory,
even before the appeals court ruled, both
the solicitor general and Windsor filed
petitions asking the Supreme Court to
review the case. Even though the district court had ruled in their favor, they
argued the DOMA question needed a
definitive answer from the highest court.
After the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court, the solicitor general
filed an additional statement with the
Supreme Court, arguing that this case,
rather a ruling from the First Circuit that
had earlier struck down DOMA’s Section
3, would make the best vehicle for ruling
on its constitutionality. On December 7,
the high court granted the solicitor general’s petition — but not Windsor’s —
adding the questions about jurisdiction.
Professor Jackson’s brief argues the
solicitor general’s petition does not present
the court with a real “controversy” because
the government does not disagree with the
rulings from the Second Circuit and the
district court. In effect, the government is
simply asking the Supreme Court to affirm
the lower court rulings.
If there is an adversary party, there is
a real controversy to decide, and that’s
where BLAG comes in. But does it have
standing to argue for reversal of the Second Circuit decision?
A party has standing if they have a
personal stake in the outcome of the
matter that is distinct from the general
interest any citizen has in the correct
interpretation of the law. Windsor has a
$363,053 stake in the matter, since she
had to fork over the money. The government always has a stake in the question
of whether a statute is constitutional,

be justified by moral disapproval, or contends that gay couples are inadequate as
parents. Both briefs are carefully written to project a matter-of-fact tone about
rational decision-making.
What they also leave out is any reference to love and affection having anything
to do with marriage. Both briefs essentially argue that marriage is about children, not about the spouses, and that the
great “danger” of “redefining” marriage
to be “genderless” is in putting the prime
focus on the marital partners instead of
the family. Neither brief acknowledges
the substantial percentage of same-sex
couples raising children and the ways
in which their exclusion from a marital
home may be harmful to them. Instead,
Cooper and Clement harp on studies
showing the disadvantages suffered by
children raised by single mothers whose
fathers have abandoned them.

Both briefs, for the most part, ignore
the huge structure of legal rights and
responsibilities attached to modern
marriage in America, paring the institution down to its rudimentary essentials in the pre-modern state. In other
words, they are appealing to the “originalists” on the high court, as Cooper
makes clear when he expresses incredulity that anyone would contend that
the generation that enacted the 14th
Amendment in 1868 intended to confer
the right to marry on gay and lesbian
couples. Those on the high court who
regard the 14th Amendment as establishing general concepts of fairness and
equality rather than a specific image
based on mid-19th century life will, one
hopes, reject this view.
There is a reasonable prospect that
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing
vote on the court, may be among that

group. In the conclusion of his opinion
in the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas sodomy
case, he wrote, “Had those who drew
and ratified the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment [1791] or the
Fourteenth Amendment [1868] known
the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more
specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew that times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress. As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.”
A month from now, those challenging
Prop 8 and DOMA will file their briefs,
and Cooper and Clement will receive
their responses. The cases will be argued
on March 26 and 27.

power” extends to “cases” and “controversies” as a limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts — they are barred
from issuing “advisory opinions,” but
instead can only rule on issues disputed
between parties who have something
personally at stake.
Windsor, a widow who lives in New
York, had to pay $363,053 in federal
estate taxes that would not have been
owed had the government recognized her
Canadian same-sex marriage to Thea
Spyer, who died in 2009. She clearly has
a stake in this lawsuit, so it presented
a real “controversy” to the US District
Court for the Southern District of New
York in Manhattan.

The brief argues the
solicitor general’s petition
doesn’t present a real
“controversy” because the
government doesn’t disagree with
rulings from the Second Circuit and
the district court.
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